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The determinants of the cross-market transmission mechanism for terrorist shocks are 
explored, focusing on two major terrorist events and 68 national stock markets. We 
generate daily abnormal returns from a three-factor world asset pricing model. Abnormal 
returns are then regressed on proxies of three transmission mechanisms; a world 
integration channel, a bilateral integration channel, and a liquidity channel. Our findings 
indicate that terrorism shocks are diffused cross-nationally, and moreover this diffusion is 
non-uniform. We find empirical support for all three channels when considered 
separately. The bilateral integration channel contains the highest explanatory power since 
we find that a third country’s trade linkages with the “ground-zero” country explain about 
24 % of the stock market reaction. A country’s share in the world trade, a proxy for the 
world integration channel, is able to explain about 12 % of abnormal return variation, 
while the liquidity channel exhibits the lowest predictive power, with the value of stock 
trading explaining about 6 %. A hybrid model, were proxies for all channels are included, 
shows that only the bilateral trade linkages with the “ground-zero” country are significant 
determinants of the stock market reaction.        
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1. Introduction   
In the post 9/11 era a new literature emerged, whose main aim has been to 
investigate various aspects of terrorism shocks’ impacts on capital markets. The extant 
literature has established the significant - and immediate - negative reaction, to major 
terrorist attacks, of “ground-zero” countries’ capital markets (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003; Carter and Simkins 2004; Chen and Siems 2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 
2004; Maillet and Michel 2005; Gulley and Sultan 2006; Amélie and Darné 2006; 
Nikkinen et al., 2008). This literature has also shown that significant negative reactions 
are also observed to third countries’ markets.  
However, an apparent gap in the literature, and in general of our understanding of 
the issue, relates to what is the underlying diffusion mechanism of major terrorist shocks. 
In other words, although we suspect that such shocks are indeed transmitted cross-
nationally, we have no concrete evidence regarding the determinants of their cross-
sectional variation. To put simply, we do not know why and how much third countries 
react in the occurrence of a major terrorist incident in another country. Clearly, providing 
an answer to this question would be of value for policy makers and supervision 
authorities, but more importantly for portfolio managers. Essentially, knowledge of these 
reaction patterns could assist portfolio managers in assessing whether diversification is 
possible. For instance, if terrorism shocks exhausted their effect within the “ground-zero” 
country, then they could be thought as being part of its idiosyncratic risk, and therefore 
able to be diversified away. If however terrorism shocks were diffused across markets, 
the diversification scope would depend on the pattern of diffusion. For instance the 
diversification gains would evaporate if shocks spread uniformly. In contrast, if shocks   3
are non-uniformly diffused, diversification would be possible, provided that one could 
pin down the basic anatomy of the transmission mechanism.  
Casual empiricism suggests that major shocks, especially of an adverse nature, or 
crises, even if considered as being mainly local, tend to diffuse cross-nationally. This 
diffusion is known as contagion, broadly defined as the spread of market disturbances 
from one country to another.  A burgeoning literature has provided the theoretical 
underpinnings for several alternative explanations for the spread of shocks from their 
original location (the “ground-zero” country) to third countries (for excellent and 
extensive reviews see Wolf 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2000). One explanation places 
emphasis on economic linkages, where essentially the spillover to a given third country 
depends on the degree of its integration with the world markets (Calvo and Reinhart 
1996; Masson 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 2002). We hereafter call this diffusion 
mechanism the world integration channel. Another explanation that has been proposed, 
similar in spirit, suggests that the transmission of shock to a country is facilitated by its 
economic ties with the “ground-zero” country. We hereafter call this transmission 
mechanism bilateral integration channel. Another class of explanations highlights the 
role of various ‘irrational’ phenomena triggered by investors’ behavior (Calvo and 
Mendoza 2001; Pritsker 2001; Kodres and Pritsker 2002). Among this class, we consider 
the role of liquidity constraints arising in the event of a major shock that may lead 
investors to sell assets in third countries to meet margin calls. Hence, according to this 
channel the contagion increases with a country’s capital market liquidity. We hereafter 
call this contagion mechanism the liquidity channel.       4
In the present study we make a first attempt to explore the determinants of 
terrorist shock diffusion. In particular, focusing in the post 9/11 period, we model stock 
market reaction patterns across 68 countries on the days of two major terrorist events 
(Madrid attack, London attack). Reaction is measured by the daily abnormal return, 
controlling for a three-factor world asset pricing as well as distributed lags of domestic 
returns. Then the analysis investigates whether the three alternative transmission channels 
contain any significant explanatory power for abnormal returns.  
Our empirical findings suggest that terrorism shocks are indeed diffused cross-
nationally, and moreover this diffusion is non-uniform. In particular, we find empirical 
support for the world integration channel since trade and financial linkages to world 
markets emerge as important ‘predictors’ for a country’s stock market reaction to terrorist 
events. Among the trade and financial linkages considered, a country’s share in the world 
trade is able to explain the highest percentage of abnormal return variation in the 
occurrence of a major terrorist incident (about 12 %). Additionally, the bilateral 
integration channel is also in operation, where we find that a third country’s trade 
linkages with the “ground-zero” country explain about 24 % of stock market reaction. 
Moreover we find empirical support for the liquidity channel with the value of stock 
trading explaining about 6 % of stock market reaction. A hybrid model including proxies 
for all three channels is able to explain about 24 % of abnormal return variation in the 
occurrence of major terrorist shocks.        
 The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the general setup 
within which one can model the transmission mechanism of terrorist shocks. Section 3 
describes data sources, the construction of variables and their sample properties. Section   5
4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings. 
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.          
2. Returns’  generation  and shock transmission 
2.1  The baseline pricing framework  
Our departure point is the asset pricing framework driving international stock 
market returns. The first building block is the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965), where in an international context the global value-weighted 
market portfolio is the relevant risk factor (Grauer et al. 1976; Adler and Dumas 1983). 
Then we consider an international version of the three-factor model (Fama and French 
1993, 1996) as follows:  
() ,, ,, i t wmp i wmp hml i hml smb i smb Er λβ λ β λβ =+ +                       (1) 
Where  () , it E r  is the expected return on stock index ( ) i  at time () t  in excess of a 
risk-free rate,  () , wmp wmp t Er λ = ,  ( ) , hml hml t Er λ = , and  ( ) , smb smb t Er λ =  are the risk premia of 
the World Market Portfolio, the High-minus-Low earnings-price ratio portfolio, and the 
Small-minus-Big market value portfolio respectively. Similarly,  , iw m p β ,  , ih m l β , and  , is m b β  
are the betas of stock index () i , measuring its sensitivity to each of the risk factors.  
This relationship becomes estimable when we allow for a stochastic shock that 
generates possibly non-spherical deviations from the long-run as follows: 
() ,, , , ,, , , it w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b it rr r r u βββ =+ + +                     (2)     6
2.2  Introducing the terrorism shock    
We define ( ) , gzc t mgt  as an impulse dummy, which denotes the occurrence of a 
major terrorist incident on day () t  and country ( ) gzc , i.e the “ground-zero” country, 
when attains the value of unity. In contrast, when ( ) , gzc t mgt  attains the value of zero there 
is no major-terrorist event and therefore denotes ‘normal’ periods. Thus, in order to 
investigate whether third countries’ markets react to the news of major terrorist attacks in 
another country, we allow the return generation process to differ between ‘normal’ 
periods (i.e in the absence of major terrorist events) and periods where such events occur. 
So returns are determined as follows:         
( ) ,, , , , , , , , ,       it w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b i g z ct it rr r r m g t u i g z c βββ γ =+ + + + ∀ ≠               (3) 
The parameter ( ) i γ  captures the sensitivity of third countries’ returns to the news 
of terrorist attack occurrence in another country and our prior is that it will carry a 
negative sign. Thus, provided that ( ) 0 i γ < , the realization of a terrorist shock will be 
diffused to third countries. Moreover, the returns in ‘normal’ periods (i.e in the absence 
of major terrorist events) are driven by fundamentals as described by a standard asset 
pricing model. In contrast during non-normal periods, although fundamentals continue to 
play a role, returns exhibit a transitory deviation from equilibrium. Hence, the following 
holds:        
( ) ( ) ,, ,, | 1 | 0 0,          it g z ct it g z ct i Er m g t Er m g t i g z c γ = − ==< ∀≠                   (4) 
                  
This expression suggests that third countries’ abnormal returns on days that major 
terrorist events occur are, on average, lower than returns on normal periods. This is a 
testable implication that we will explore later on.    7
2.3  A look into potential diffusion mechanisms  
Recall that our main purpose is to investigate the determinants of third countries’ 
stock market reactions to terrorism shocks. To tackle this issue we consider three types of 
potential transmission channels. The first focuses on a country’s economic linkages with 
world markets and in particular considers trade and financial linkages. If a country has a 
high degree of real (trade) or financial linkages with global markets, it is expected to 
exhibit a more extensive response given a shock in another country. In contrast, countries 
that are not sufficiently integrated are to some extent immune to the shock (Calvo and 
Reinhart 1996; Masson 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 2002). The second brings to centre 
stage a country’s relationship vis-à-vis  the “ground-zero” country, and in particular 
considers their bilateral trade and financial linkages. The third emphasizes a country’s 
stock market liquidity. The literature advocates that in the occurrence of a major terrorist 
event, causing downward pressure to a country’s asset prices, market participants would 
benefit most from selling in highly liquid markets since this lowers the impact of their 
sell orders on prices. (Kodres and Pritsker 2001; Calvo and Mendoza 2001).  
Going back to the return generation process, we investigate whether third 
countries’ reaction to major terrorist events is explained by a given channel () , it x . Then 
in the spirit of Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997), Ng (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
and Bekaert et al. (2005), we allow third countries’ sensitivity to be time-varying as 
follows:  
() 0, 1 , ii i t x γδδ =+                                                   (5) 
Then expression (3) becomes:    8
( ) ( )
() () ()
,, , , , , , 0 , 1 , , ,
,, ,, ,, 0 , , 1 , , ,
*
     *
i t wmp t i wmp hml t i hml smb t i smb i i t gzc t i t
wmp t i wmp hml t i hml smb t i smb gzc t i i t gzc t i t
rr r r x m g t u
r r r mgt x mgt u
βββ δ δ
βββ δ δ
 =+ + + + + = 
=+ + + + +
  
         (6) 
This expression nests various alternative possibilities regarding the diffusion of terrorist 
shocks, described below:   
 
Suppose for the time being that the sign configuration shown in Case 3 is valid then it 
would imply that:  
() () () ,, ,, 0 , 1 , | 1 | 0 0,          it g z ct it g z ct i it Er m g t Er m g t Ex i g z c δδ = − ==+ < ∀≠                      (7) 
This expression has two testable implications: (a) third countries’ abnormal returns (stock 
market reactions) are significantly lower on days of major terrorist events’ occurrence, i.e 
terrorist shocks are diffused cross-nationally, and (b) the size of reaction (absolute 
magnitude of abnormal returns) increases with a country’s exposure to a given channel.   
     
Case 1: major terrorism events do not affect third countries’ capital markets; 
0, 1 0 i δ δ ==  
Case 2: major terrorist events affect third countries in a uniform manner,
irrespectively of their exposure to each transmission channel;  0, 1 00 i δ δ < ∧=   
Case 3: the diffusion of shocks is non-uniform and mirrors differential exposures to 
the transmission channel;   0, 1 0, 0  i δ δ <<    9
3. Data  issues 
3.1  Returns and systematic risk factors   
Daily closing prices from 1/1/2002 to 30/12/2005 in local currencies for broad 
stock market indices where obtained from Datastream  for the following countries 
(detailed list of stock indices by country is provided in the Appendix, part A): Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Equador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.   
Consider a vector of stock market index prices, ( ) , it I , where ( ) i  and () t  denote 

















                        (8) 
The three benchmark portfolios denoting the risk factors are proxied by the global 
equity market portfolios maintained by World Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI World) indices as follows: ( ) , wmp t r  defined as the return on the world market 
portfolio,  () , smb t r  defined as the difference between the return on a world portfolio of 
small capitalization stocks and the return on a portfolio of large capitalization stocks 
(smb, small minus big), () , hml t r  defined as the difference between the return on a world   10
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks (value) and the return on low book-to-market 
(growth) stocks (hml, high minus low), which proxies the value or distress premium.  
3.2 Construction  of  transmission channels’ proxies       
Let  () i  denote the country and ( ) y  the year. To measure a country’s trade 
integration with world markets we use data from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database. The IFS provides the value (in US Dollars) of trade (imports 
and exports) between a given country and all of its trading partners. Then for each 
country we calculate the sum of its exports ( ) , iy X  and imports ( ) , iy M , and measure what 





















 =  + 
 ∑
                      (9)            
We also consider whether there are any differences between the explanatory 
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A country’s financial linkages with world markets are based on the IMF’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database, which provides information 
on the stock of cross-border holdings of securities (equity and debt securities) valued at   11
market prices prevailing at the end of each year, and broken down by the economy of 
residence of the issuer of the securities. Note that these securities are not part of the 
balance of payments data categories of direct investment, reserve assets, or financial 
derivatives. The CPIS provides information on the following: (i) inward () , iy eqin  and 
outward  () , iy eqout  investment on equity securities, (ii) inward ( ) , iy dein  and outward 
() , iy deout  investment in debt securities. In a manner similar to the trade linkages, we 












eqin eqout dein deout
fina
eqin eqout dein deout
  ++ +    =   ++ +     ∑
                  (12) 
We also construct alternative proxies by breaking total portfolio investment assets into 














  +    =   +     ∑














  +    =   +     ∑
                      (14) 
In order to capture the linkages with the “ground-zero” country we resort to two 
metrics. The first captures bilateral trade linkages, and is defined as the percentage their 
bilateral imports and exports ( )
, gzc iy bitrade  represent to both countries’ trade with the rest 
of the world;  () ( ) ,, iy g z cy
world
trade trade
















 =   +      ∑
                                 (15) 
The data for the trade bilateral linkages were obtained from the United Nation’s 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). The UN also compiles a similar 
database covering services trade, however there are severe limitations due to a substantial 
portion of missing data.  
The second measures a country’s overall financial linkages with the “ground-
zero” country, defined as the percentage their bilateral financial linkages ( )
, gzc iy bifina  
represent to both countries’ financial linkages with the rest of the world; 
() ( ) ,, iy g z cy
world
fina fina
















 =   +      ∑
                    (16)   
 
Using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators we proxy a 
country’s stock market liquidity by two alternative metrics; the stock market 
capitalization () , iy MC  as a ratio to gross domestic product, and the value of stock trading 
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In Table 1 we report the basic descriptive statistics for the potential transmission channel 
proxies, while in Table 2 we report their pairwise sample correlations. Note the strong 
correlation between any pair of proxies belonging to the same channel, which is 
indicative of the commonality in information that precludes their joint inclusion as 
explanatory variables in any model. In contrast, the correlations of proxies between 
channels are substantially lower, allowing one to consider combinations of channels as 
regressors.                        
----------Table 1---------- 
----------Table 2---------- 
3.3 Identifying  major  terrorist  attacks: the stimulus    
Apparently there is no hard definition of what constitutes a major-terrorist incident and 
consequently some arbitrariness in the choice of events is in order. We use the following 
terrorist incidents: the Madrid attack on March 11
th 2004 and the London attack on July 
7
th 2005. Table 3 provides some important background information related to these 
attacks.  
----------Table 3---------- 
4. Econometric  methodology 
We use a flexible empirical specification whose core is a three-factor world model where, 
apart from the current values of the risk factors, we also include up to five lags to capture 
any non-synchronization in trading. In addition, we allow for a similar autoregressive 
structure for country returns. In order to capture any calendar anomalies we use fixed 
month and day effects, over and above year effects (Gibbons and Hess 1981; Jaffe and   14
Westerfield 1985; Kato and Shallheim 1985; Board and Sutcliffe 1988; Choudhry 2001). 
The employed baseline empirical model is of the following form: 
 
()
() ( ) ( )
55 5 5
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,         + year effects month effects day effects
i t wmp j wmp t j smb j smb t j hml j hml t j j i t j
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ii t
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      
++ + +
∑∑ ∑ ∑
            
       (19)  
Given the panel dimension we condition on country heterogeneity allowing for an 
unobserved effect  i µ  treated as random, assuming that  ( ) , 0      , , it j i E ri j t µ − =∀ . 
A well established empirical regularity is the volatility clustering exhibited by 
daily returns (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986). Thus, in order to control for this we employ 
a Pooled Panel GARCH (PP-GARCH hereafter) model for the conditional volatility of 
stock returns (Cermeno and Grier 2006). Although multivariate GARCH models are also 
available, they are not practical for most panel applications because they require the 
estimation of a large number of parameters which consumes degrees of freedom rapidly. 
In contrast, PP-GARCH estimation by imposing common dynamics on the variance-
covariance process across cross-sectional units reduces the number of parameters 
dramatically ensuring parsimony. We then allow a more flexible specification for the 
error term with:  
( ) , 0 it E ε =  and  ( )
22
,, it it E ε σ =  
In particular, assuming that  ,, ~0 , it it N ε   Ω  , i.e. are multivariate normal error 
terms with a time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix produces a PP-GARCH   15
model (Cermeno and Grier 2006). The variance-covariance matrix  , it Ω  is time-dependent 
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where the 
* θ ’s, ψ ’s, η ’s and ρ ’s denote unknown constant parameters to be estimated.   
4.1  The effect of transmission channels 
In order to investigate whether linkages contain significant information for 
abnormal returns, we recover the residuals ( ) ,, ˆ |1 it g z ct mgt ε =  from model (19) focusing on 
the days of the two major terrorist events. It should be noted that due to the different time 
zones of countries included in the sample, one should correct for the non-synchronous 
trading. We have followed the standard practice of using the lag or the lead of the return 
for countries at different time zones accordingly. However, in order to avoid further 
complication of notation we denote all abnormal returns at time ( ) t .          
Let  () ,, mit x  denote the possible reaction determinant where () m  denotes a 
particular transmission channel proxy. Then we project the residuals on each of these 
proxies allowing for up to a third-order polynomial to capture potential non-linearities: 
() ()
3




it g z ct ms mit mit
s
mgt x u εγ γ
=
==+ + ∑                     (21) 
After the estimation stage we proceed with three steps. Firstly, for each potential 
channel proxy, by the means of formal hypotheses testing, we establish the preferred   16
specification (i.e linear, quadratic or cubic). Secondly, we explore whether each type of 
linkages contains significant explanatory power over abnormal returns by testing:  
0, :0 ,      , ms Hm s γ = ∀                           (22)      
 
Provided that a particular set of hypotheses is rejected, it would imply that the associated 
channel of diffusion is in operation and furthermore, that the diffusion of terrorist shocks 
is non-uniformly distributed across countries. Thirdly we embark on a comparison 
between potential diffusion channels in terms of their relative explanatory power over 
abnormal returns.  
5. Empirical  results 
5.1   Preliminary unconditional analysis  
As a prelude to the subsequent econometric analysis we provide some descriptive 
statistics that will shed light in data properties. The sample mean of (pooled) realized 
returns excluding the days of major attacks was 0.092 % with a standard deviation of 1.26 
%, while the corresponding figures on the days of these attacks were -0.409 % and 1.35 
%. This information is indicative of large negative market reactions on days of major 
attack occurrences.  
5.2 Main  Results 
Before we move to the investigation of our main hypotheses, we first estimate the 
parameters of the three-factor world model under a set of alternative techniques and 
specifications, with the aim to select the one which more adequately fits daily returns. In 
particular, we use a Random-Effects, and three Pooled Panel GARCH models; a PP-
ARCH(1), a PP-ARCH(2) and a PP-GARCH(1,1) (estimation results are given in Table 
A1 in the Appendix, part B). The RE model is outperformed by its PP-GARCH   17
counterparts, since in every specification the parameters in the conditional volatility 
equation are highly significant, suggesting that volatility clustering is present. Then after 
a sequence of Likelihood Ratio tests, the PP-GARCH(1,1) emerges as the preferred 
specification.  
Then, we recover the residuals obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, which 
we regress on each of the potential transmission channels, considering three competing 
specifications (a linear, a quadratic and a cubic). Based on formal hypotheses tests we 
selected the specification that best fitted the data (detailed results are provided in the in 
Tables A2-A6 in the Appendix, part B).  
5.2.1  The role of the world integration channel    
In Table 4 we report the results from projecting abnormal returns to proxies of the 
world integration channel corresponding to the selected specifications. All trade linkages’ 
proxies contain significant explanatory power for abnormal returns. The relationship 
between abnormal returns and linkages is non-linear, and in particular is found to be 
cubic for overall trade and imports, while quadratic for exports. Turning now our 
attention to linkages’ explanatory power (adjusted coefficient of determination) we find 
that overall trade linkages explain about 14.4 %, while imports and exports are able to 
explain about 14.5 % and 11 % of abnormal return variation.  
----------Table 4--------- 
In Table 5 we report the results for the financial linkages with world markets. 
Total portfolio investment linkages account for 7 % of abnormal returns’ variation. 
However, the decomposition of total financial linkages into its main constituents, equity   18
and debt linkages reveals that equity investment has a very poor explanatory power 
(about 2 %). In contrast, debt linkages explain about 8 % of abnormal return variation.   
----------Table 5--------- 
Thus, among the proxies for the world integration channel considered, overall 
trade linkages have the highest explanatory power over cross-country stock market 
reactions.  
5.2.2  The roles of the bilateral linkages and liquidity channels  
In Table 6 we summarize the estimation results from regressing abnormal returns 
on proxies of the bilateral integration and liquidity channels. Trade linkages with the 
“ground-zero” country emerge as the most important determinant of stock market 
reaction, accounting for about 24 % of abnormal return variation. Financial linkages with 
the “ground-zero” countries are also significant, accounting for about 7 % of abnormal 
return variation. The estimated parameters indicate that, in the occurrence of a major 
terrorist event in a given country, third countries’ stock market reaction increases with 
their ties with the “ground-zero” country. 
As it regards to the liquidity channel, we find that abnormal returns are 
significantly correlated both with the stock market capitalization and the value of stock 
market trading. In particular, stock market capitalization explains about 5.5 % of stock 
market reactions while the value of trading about 6 %. These findings suggest that indeed 
more liquid markets tend to react more strongly as suggested by theory.  
----------Table 6---------   19
5.2.3  A hybrid model for stock market reactions 
Our estimation results suggest that all three transmission channels are in operation when 
considered separately. Now we construct a hybrid model that brings together all three 
with the aim to better fit observed stock market reactions. From each channel we select 
the proxy with the highest explanatory power provided that it is not collinear with the rest 
of the channel proxies, i.e. overall trade linkages with the world (world integration 
channel), trade linkages with the “ground-zero” country (bilateral integration channel) 
and stock market capitalization (liquidity channel). Table 7 summarizes the estimation 
results. The hybrid model accounts for 24 % of abnormal return variation, whose 
explanatory power is comparable to that obtained from trade linkages with the “ground-
zero” country. The hypotheses tests for the significance of each channel, controlling for 
the presence of the other channels, indicate that only the bilateral integration channel is 
significant at all conventional levels.              
----------Table 7--------- 
 6.  Conclusions 
In the present study we make a first attempt to investigate the underlying cross-
market transmission mechanism of major terrorist shocks, which has so far been 
unexplored. In particular, focusing in the post 9/11 period, we use two major terrorist 
events (Madrid and London attacks) and model stock market reaction patterns across 68 
countries. Reaction is measured by the daily abnormal return, controlling for a three-
factor world asset pricing, as well as distributed lags of domestic returns. Then the 
analysis investigates three potential channels for the cross-country diffusion of terrorist 
shocks: (i) integration with world markets, (ii) linkages vis-à-vis the “ground-zero” 
country, and (iii) stock market liquidity.    20
Our empirical findings suggest that terrorism shocks are indeed diffused cross-
nationally, and moreover this diffusion is non-uniform. In particular, we find empirical 
support for the world integration channel since trade and financial linkages emerge as 
significant predictors for a country’s stock market reaction to terrorist events. Among the 
trade and financial linkages considered, a country’s share in world trade is able to explain 
the highest percentage of abnormal return variation in the occurrence of a major terrorist 
incident. The bilateral linkages channel is also active where third countries’ trade 
linkages with the “ground-zero” country account for about 24 % of the cross-country 
variation in reaction to terrorist shocks. Moreover we find empirical support for the 
liquidity channel since stock market capitalization is also a significant determinant of 
stock market reaction. A hybrid model were all three channels are jointly included 
suggest that only bilateral trade linkages with the “ground-zero” country are significant 
determinants of stock market reaction.       
These findings have important implications for supervision authorities but more 
importantly for portfolio managers. The non-uniform reaction to major terrorist shocks 
implies that there is ample scope for diversification. Future research could extend the set 
of explanatory variables including other structural country characteristics over and above 
linkages, such as market structure, ownership structure and liquidity. In addition, non-
financial factors could also be explored, such as the impact of terrorism shocks on 
investor sentiment and risk aversion.        
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Appendix 
A. List of stock market indices / country:  
Merval / Argentina, ASX All Ordinaries Index / Australia, ATX / Austria, Bahrain 
Stock Exchange Index / Bahrain, BEL 20 / Belgium, Bovespa / Brazil, BSE SOFIX / 
Bulgaria, S&P/TSX Composite Index / Canada, Chile General (IGPA)  / Chile, IGBC 
Index / Colombia, CROBEX / Croatia, Cyprus General / Cyprus, Prague SE PX / 
Czech Republic, OMX Copenhagen  / Denmark, ECU Price Index / Ecuador, Hermes 
Financial / Egypt, OMX Tallinn / Estonia, OMX Helsinki / Finland, CAC 40 / France, 
DAX 30 / Germany, Athex Composite / Greece, Hang Seng / Hong Kong, Budapest 
Index (BUX)  / Hungary, OMX Iceland All Share / Iceland, BSE 100 /  India, Jakarta 
SE Composite / Indonesia, Ireland SE Overall / Ireland, Israel TA 100 / Israel, Milan 
MIDEX / Italy, Nikkei 225 / Japan, Amman SE Financial Market / Jordan, Korea SE 
Composite (KOSPI) / Korea, Kuwait KIC General / Kuwait, OMX Riga / Latvia, 
Lebanon Blom / Lebanon, OMX Vilnius / Lithuania, Luxemburg SE General / 
Luxemburg,  KLCI Composite / Malaysia, MSE / Malta, Mexico IPC (BOLSA) / 
Mexico, AEX Index / Netherlands, NZX 50 / New Zealand, Oslo Exchange All Share / 
Norway,  Oman Muscat Securities / Oman, Karachi SE 100 / Pakistan, Lima SE 
General (IGBL) / Peru, Phillipine SE (PSEI) / Philippines, Warsaw General Index / 
Poland, Portugal PSI General / Portugal, Doha Securities General Index / Qatar, BET 
Composite Index / Romania, Russia RTS Index / Russian Federation, All Share Index 
(TASI) / Saudi Arabia, Straits Times Index / Singapore, Slovak Share Index (SAX) / 
Slovakia, Slovene Stock Exchange Index (SBI 20) / Slovenia, Madrid SE General / 
Spain, Colombo SE All Share Index / Sri Lanka, OMX Stockholm / Sweden, Swiss 
Market Price Index / Switzerland, Taiwan SE Weighted / Taiwan, Bangkok SET 
Price Index / Thailand, ISE National 100 / Turkey, Kinto KINDEX / Ukraine, Abu 
Dhabi All Securities Index / United Arab Emirates, FTSE All Share / United Kingdom, 
NYSE Composite / United States, and Venezuela SE General / Venezuela.    24
B. Tables  
 
Table A1. Baseline specification for daily stock returns: Three-Factor World Model (2002-2005) 
  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1) 
 a PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 
Regressor  Point estimate (z-score) 
 b 
  Mean equation 































































































































































































































































(0.02)   25
Year effects 
c included included  included  included 
Month effects  included  included  included  included 
Day effects  included  included  included  Included 
Conditional Variance Equation 









ARCH(2)  - -  0.354
*** 
(8.69)  - 
GARCH(1) -  -  - 0.857
*** 
(90.05) 






















Notes:  (a)  PP-ARCH stands for Pooled Panel Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) Year, Month, Day effects denote 3, 11, and 4 zero / one 
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Table A2. World integration channel and abnormal returns I: Trade, Financial linkages 
a, b, c  
Panel A: Overall Trade linkages 
Regressor
 d  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 trade   - -  -0.009*10
-1 *** 
(-3.99) 
2 R   0.028 0.079 0.144 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.020 0.064 0.123 
Observations   125  125  125 
Hypotheses tests  
Cubic vs. linear 
e  - -  9.59
*** 
Cubic vs. quadratic 
f  - -  15.88
*** 
Quadratic vs. linear
 g  - 4.23
**  - 






Panel B: Overall Financial linkages 
Regressor 
 i  Linear Quadratic Cubic 
















3 fina   - -  -0.006*10
-1 ** 
(-2.28) 
2 R   0.040 0.039 0.095 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.019 0.021 0.069 
Observations   111  111  111 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear  -  -  3.70
** 
Cubic vs. quadratic  -  -  5.21
** 
Quadratic vs. linear  -  2.22  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel  4.31
**  2.12 12.82
*** 
Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) () trade stands for overall trade linkages with the world, (e) F-test for the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) F-test for model 
overall significance, (i) () fina  stands for overall financial linkages with the world.  
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Table A3. World integration channel and abnormal returns II: Imports, Exports 
a, b, c   
Panel A: Imports 
Regressor
  d  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 imp   - -  -0.006
*** 
(-4.28) 
2 R   0.033 0.061 0.145 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.025 0.046 0.124 
Observations   125  125  125 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear
 e  - -  9.85
*** 
Cubic vs. quadratic
 f  - -  18.32
*** 
Quadratic vs. linear 
g  - 4.83
**  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel




Panel B: Exports 
Regressor
  i  Linear Quadratic Cubic 
















3 exp   - -  -0.002 
(-0.57) 
2 R   0.020 0.111 0.113 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.012 0.097 0.091 
Observations   125  125  125 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear  -  -  6.05
*** 
Cubic vs. quadratic  -  -  0.32
 
Quadratic vs. linear  -  12.05
***  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel  1.87 7.65
*** 5.07
*** 
Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) () imp  stands for import linkages with the world (e) F-test for the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) F-test for model 
overall significance, (i)() exp stands for export linkages with the world.    28
 
Table A4. World integration channel and abnormal returns III: Equity, Debt 
a, b, c   
Panel A: Equity 
Regressor
  d  Linear Quadratic Cubic 















3 equ   - -  -0.002*10
-1 
(-1.51) 
2 R   0.028 0.041 0.066 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.019 0.023 0.040 
Observations   111  111  111 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear
 e  - -  2.32 
Cubic vs. quadratic
 f   - -  2.27 
Quadratic vs. linear 
g  - 2.66 - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel




Panel B: Debt 
Regressor
  i  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 debt   - -  -0.008*10
-1 *** 
(-2.95) 
2 R   0.026 0.041 0.106 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.017 0.024 0.080 
Observations   111  111  111 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear  -  -  4.89
*** 
Cubic vs. quadratic  -  -  8.73
*** 
Quadratic vs. linear  -  2.29
  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel  3.14
*  2.18 13.66
*** 
Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d)() equ  stands for equity linkages with the world, (e) F-test for the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) F-test for model 
overall significance, (i) () debt  stands for debt linkages with the world.  
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Table A5. Bilateral integration channel and abnormal returns III: Trade, Financial 
a, b, c   
Panel A: Trade 
Regressor
  d  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 tradegzc   - -  -0.155
*** 
(-5.19) 
2 R   0.081 0.147 0.261 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.073 0.133 0.242 
Observations   121  121  121 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear
 e  - -  15.05
*** 
Cubic vs. quadratic
 f  - -  26.93
*** 
Quadratic vs. linear 
g  - 3.56
*  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel




Panel B: Financial 
Regressor
  i  Linear Quadratic Cubic 
















3 finagzc   - -  -0.123
** 
(-2.57) 
2 R   0.026 0.038 0.101 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.015 0.016 0.070 
Observations    91 91 91 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear  -  -  4.20
** 
Cubic vs. quadratic  -  -  6.62
** 
Quadratic vs. linear  -  1.22  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel  2.44
  1.45 4.15
*** 
Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) () tradegzc stands for bilateral trade linkages with the “ground-zero” country (e) F-test for the null 
hypotheses that the coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squared term is zero, (h) 
F-test for model overall significance, (i) () finagzc  stands for bilateral financial linkages with the “ground-zero” 
country.  
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Table A6. Liquidity channel and abnormal returns III: Stock market capitalization, value of stock 
trading  
a, b, c   
Panel A: Stock market capitalization   
Regressor
  d  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 smc   - -  -0.002*10
-4 ** 
(-2.48) 
2 R   0.025 0.047 0.077 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.017 0.032 0.055 
Observations   125  125  125 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear
 e  - -  3.95
** 
Cubic vs. quadratic
 f   - -  6.15
** 
Quadratic vs. linear 
g  - 3.90
*  - 
Linkages not a diffusion 
channel




Panel B: Value of stock trading 
Regressor
  i  Linear Quadratic Cubic 

















3 vst   - -  -0.0001*10
-3 
(-0.66) 
2 R   0.059 0.075 0.078 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.052 0.060 0.055 
Observations   125  125  125 
Hypotheses Tests  
Cubic vs. linear  -  -  2.91
* 
Cubic vs. quadratic  -  -  0.44
 
Quadratic vs. linear  -  5.34
**  - 





Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) () smc  stands for the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, e) F-test for the null hypotheses 
that the coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
of the cubic term is zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the squatted term is zero, (h) F-test for 
model overall significance, (i) () vst  stands for the ratio of value of stock trading to GDP.  Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (time period 2002-2005)  
World integration channel 
Proxy 
a, b, c, d, e  Mean 
f  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
( ) trade
  2.98 4.77 0.08  29.47  133 
() imp   1.47 2.65 0.04  18.06  133 
( ) exp   1.48 2.25 0.02  11.41  133 
() fina
  3.16 6.46  0.003
  38.27 109 
() equ   3.34 7.48  0.001  47.50  109 
() debt   3.04 5.99  0.001  31.88  109 
Bilateral integration channel 
( ) tradegzc   0.68 1.08 0.01  5.69  127 
( ) finagzc   0.81 1.41 0.00  9.54  100 
Liquidity channel   
( ) smc   77.93 71.17  3.00  401.00  133 
( ) vst   49.64 61.75  0.00  350.00  132 
Notes:  (a)  () trade ,() imp ,  () exp stand for overall trade, import, and export linkages with the world respectively, (b) 
() fina ,() equ , () debt  stand for overall financial, equity and debt linkages with the world respectively,  (c) () tradegzc , () finagzc  
stand for bilateral trade and financial linkages with the “ground-zero” country respectively, (d) ( ) smc ,  ( ) vst  stand for the ratio 
of stock market capitalization and value of stock trading to GDP respectively, (e) Original data sources:  ( ) trade ,() imp , () exp ; 
IMF’s  International Financial Statistics,  () fina ,() equ ,  () debt ; IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 
() tradegzc ,  () finagzc ; UN’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database,  ( ) smc ,  () vst ; World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, and own calculations, (f) Mean, Std. Dev, Min, Max, Obs, stand for the sample mean, standard deviation, 
maximum, minimum, and number of observations respectively.     32
 
Table 2. Sample correlation matrix of diffusion channel proxies 
 a, b, c, d 
  ( ) trade   () imp   () exp   () fina
  ( ) equ   () debt   ( ) tradegzc   ( ) finagzc   ( ) smc   ( ) vst  
() trade
  1.00 - -  - - -  -  -  - - 
() imp   0.96  1.00  -  - - -  -  -  - - 
() exp   0.96  0.87  1.00  - - -  -  -  - - 
() fina
  0.85 0.92  0.78  1.00 -  -  -  -  -  - 
() equ   0.76 0.89  0.68  0.97  1.00 -  -  -  -  - 
() debt   0.87 0.92  0.82  0.98  0.92  1.00  -  -  -  - 
( ) tradegzc 0.44 0.28  0.35  0.27  0.17 0.33  1.00  -  -  - 
( ) finagzc   0.46 0.40  0.37  0.47  0.42  0.48 0.58  1.00  -  - 
() smc   0.11 0.21  0.07  0.21  0.27  0.15 -0.05  0.15  1.00  - 
() vst   0.35 0.52  0.37  0.48  0.51  0.44 0.18  0.26  0.65  1.00 
Notes: (a)  ( ) trade ,() imp , () exp stand for overall trade, import, and export linkages with the world respectively, (b) () fina ,() equ , () debt  stand for overall financial, 
equity and debt linkages with the world respectively,  (c) () tradegzc ,  () finagzc  stand for bilateral trade and financial linkages with the “ground-zero” country 
respectively, (d) ( ) smc , () vst  stand for the ratio of stock market capitalization and value of stock trading to GDP respectively.  
Table 3: Background information on major terrorist attacks used as stimulus 





7:37 am local time 
(6:37 am GMT) 
Train stations  191  1876 
London  July 7
th 2005 
8:50 – 9:47 am local 
time 
Underground trains, bus  54  700 
Notes: Source “Patterns of Global Terrorism: Part 4 Chronology of Significant Terrorist Events 1985-2005”, U.S. 
Department of State, 2005.   
Table 4.  World integration channel and abnormal returns I: trade linkages 
a, b, c, d     
Parameter /  
Diffusion channel proxy
 e   ( ) trade   ( ) imp   ( ) exp  























(-4.28)  - 
2 R   0.144 0.145  0.111 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.123 0.124  0.097 
Observations   125  125  125 





Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) each column reports the estimation results from the preferred specification (full results for the 
linear, quadratic and cubic models are provided in the Appendix, (e) ( ) trade ,() imp ,  () exp stand for overall trade, 
import, and export linkages with the world respectively, (f) F-test for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the 
cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the cubic term is zero, 
(h) F-test for model overall significance.     35
 
 
Table 5.  World integration channel and abnormal returns II: financial linkages 
a, b, c, d     
Parameter /  
Diffusion channel proxy
 e  ( ) fina   ( ) equ   ( ) debt  









,2 m γ   0.032
** 
(2.40)  -  0.037
*** 
(3.06) 
,3 m γ   -0.006*10
-1 ** 
(-2.28)  -  -0.008*10
-1 *** 
(-2.95) 
2 R   0.095 0.028  0.106 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.069 0.019  0.080 
Observations   111  111  111 
Diffusion channel not in operation




Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) each column reports the estimation results from the preferred specification (full results for the 
linear, quadratic and cubic models are provided in the Appendix, (e)() fina ,() equ , () debt  stand for overall financial, 
equity and debt linkages with the world respectively ,  (f) F-test for the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the cubic 
and square terms are jointly zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the cubic term is zero, (h) F-
test for model overall significance.     36
 
 
Table 6.  Bilateral integration, Liquidity channels and abnormal returns 
a,  b, c, d     




Parameter /   
Diffusion channel proxy  ( ) tradegzc   ( ) finagzc   ( ) smc   ( ) vst  
































(-2.48)  - 
2 R   0.261 0.101  0.077  0.075 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.242 0.070  0.055  0.060 
Observations   121  91  125  125 
Diffusion channel not in 
operation





Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) each column reports the estimation results from the preferred specification (full results for the 
linear, quadratic and cubic models are provided in the Appendix, (e) () tradegzc ,  () finagzc  stand for bilateral trade 
and financial linkages with the “ground-zero” country respectively,  (f) ( ) smc ,  ( ) vst  stand for the ratio of stock 
market capitalization and value of stock trading to GDP respectively, (g) F-test for the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients of the cubic and square terms are jointly zero, (h) F-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
cubic term is zero, (i) F-test for model overall significance.     37
 
Table 7. Hybrid model for abnormal returns
 a, b, c  
Regressor
 d  Point estimate (t-test) 
() trade   -0.120 
(-0.85) 
()




3 trade   -0.004*10
-1 
(-1.43) 





















3 smc   -0.001*10
-4 * 
(-1.72) 
2 R   0.297 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.240 
Observations   121 
Hypotheses Tests 
 
World integration channel not a diffusion 
mechanism
 e  1.12 




Liquidity channel not a diffusion mechanism
 g  1.70
 
Overall significance
 h  7.72
*** 
Notes: (a) dependent variable is the abnormal return obtained from the PP-GARCH(1,1) model, (b) ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (c) numbers in brackets denote t-tests based on robust 
standard errors, (d) () trade ,  () tradegzc , and ( ) smc  stand for overall trade linkages with the world, bilateral trade 
linkages with the “ground-zero” country, and stock market capitalization over GDP respectively,  (e) F-test for the null 




trade  are jointly zero, (f) F-test for the null hypotheses that the 
coefficients  of () tradegzc ,()
2
tradegzc ,  ()
3
tradegzc are jointly zero, (g) F-test for the null hypothesis that the 




smc are jointly zero, (h) F-test for model overall significance.   
  